Should the decline in the personal saving rate be a cause for concern? by C. Alan Garner
Should the Decline 
in the Personal Saving Rate 
Be a Cause for Concern?
By C. Alan Garner
T
he personal saving rate has been drifting downward for the last
two decades. According to the latest statistics, personal saving
declined from about 10 percent of disposable income in the
early 1980s to 1.8 percent in 2004. The decline has received particular
attention recently because saving was negative in 2005 for the first time
since the Great Depression. Although saving declined in other developed
countries during this period, the U.S. decline was more pronounced than
in most of these countries.
Many analysts and policymakers have expressed concern about the
decline in the personal saving rate. A major concern is whether U.S.
households are providing adequately for long-term needs, such as future
retirement and medical expenses. With average life expectancies length-
ening and the large baby-boom generation approaching retirement,
many households will need to tap their personal savings to supplement
increasingly pressured public and corporate retirement programs. In
addition, low personal saving has created short-run concerns that a
sudden increase in the saving rate could reduce growth of consumer
spending, real output, and employment.
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5But there is another, often overlooked side to this story. Two major
factors suggest the decline in the personal saving rate may not be as
alarming as it is sometimes made out to be. First, various measurement
problems with the personal saving rate from the national income and
product accounts suggest household saving may not have declined as
much as the statistics suggest. Second, economic theory assumes that
households rationally anticipate future labor income and asset returns
and plan their spending accordingly. If this assumption is correct, the
low personal saving rate may not foreshadow wrenching future adjust-
ments in consumer spending. 
This article provides some perspective on the decline in the per-
sonal saving rate over the last two decades. The first section describes
the decline in the most common measure of the personal saving rate
and the economic explanations offered for this decline. The second
section surveys some of the measurement issues related to the decline
and presents some alternative saving measures. After weighing the
issues, the third section concludes that, although there are some legiti-
mate reasons for concern, the decline in the personal saving rate may
not be as alarming as it first appears.
I.  THE DECLINE IN THE PERSONAL SAVING RATE
The downward trend in the personal saving rate has prompted
expressions of concern by economists and other observers. Roach wrote
that “the U.S. needs to end its buying binge and rediscover the art of
saving,” while Eisinger worried that the United States will end up with
“zombie consumers” similar to the “zombie companies” that littered the
Japanese economic landscape in the 1990s. Lansing warned that “the
decline in the U.S. personal saving rate and the dearth of internal saving
raise concerns for the future.” Underlying these and virtually every
other discussion of saving trends is a point of agreement—saving for the
future  is important. This section begins by reviewing why saving is
important and then provides some background on the downward trend
in the U.S. personal saving rate.
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Why saving matters
The purpose of saving is to increase the resources available for
future consumption. This point is true both for individual consumers
and the nation as a whole. Households put aside some of their current
income to provide for future consumption, such as a major vacation or
basic living expenses during retirement. Saving also helps protect
against an unexpected loss of household income caused, for example, by
illness or an unanticipated layoff. Typically, households invest their
savings in financial assets, such as a bank account or mutual fund, or
build equity in a real asset, such as a home. These assets can be
redeemed or sold to others in the future to provide the funds needed to
buy consumer goods and services.
Personal saving is also important for the nation as a whole.
Today’s saving influences future consumption because investments in
financial assets are channeled into productive investments in factories,
industrial machinery, computers, and other kinds of capital. Increases
in the capital stock raise the nation’s ability to produce consumer
goods and services in the future. A higher capital stock also raises the
productivity of future workers and their wages, providing increased
income with which to purchase the increased quantity of consumer
goods and services.
1
Much of the concern about the low personal saving rate reflects the
aging of the U.S. population and the pressure that aging will place on the
nation’s healthcare and retirement systems. The U.S. population has been
aging gradually in recent decades, but the share of the population 65 and
older will rise much faster over the next 25 years as the large postwar
baby-boom generation ages. Various factors, including population aging
and new medical technologies, have also caused medical costs to climb
faster than the overall inflation rate. As a result, the Social Security and
Medicare programs face huge unfunded liabilities (Hakkio and
Wiseman). Meeting these future obligations might require higher tax
burdens on future working-age families. Increased saving could help
reduce such burdens by raising the domestic capital stock and increasing
output per worker. More productive workers would receive higher wages,
making it easier for working-age families to pay higher social insurance
taxes if fiscal policymakers should decide to raise these taxes in the future.
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The decline in the NIPA saving rate
The most commonly cited measure of personal saving is from the
national income and product accounts (NIPA) produced by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. The NIPA saving rate measures funds taken
out of current household income and made available for capital forma-
tion, such as investment in a new home or business equipment.
2
Personal saving in NIPA equals disposable personal income less per-
sonal outlays. Disposable personal income is the after-tax spendable
income of the household and nonprofit sector. Personal outlays are
mostly personal consumption expenditures, but also include transfers
and nonmortgage interest payments.
3
The NIPA personal saving rate does not include capital gains and
losses on existing assets. These accounts were designed to measure
current productive activity, but an increase or decrease in the value of an
existing asset does not correspond to current production. This defini-
tion of saving is also well suited to national income accounting because
its calculation requires only current information on income, taxes paid,
and personal outlays. The national income accountant does not have to
make forecasts of any future values, which would be uncertain and,
perhaps, controversial.
Based on currently available statistics, the decline in the NIPA per-
sonal saving rate appears to have begun in the mid-1980s (Chart 1).
After averaging 9.6 percent of disposable income in the 1970s, the per-
sonal saving rate rose to 10.4 percent in 1980-84. However, the
personal saving rate declined steadily thereafter from 7.7 percent in
1985-89 to 6.5 percent in 1990-94, 3.8 percent in 1995-99, and 2.1
percent in 2000-04. The current NIPA estimate for the saving rate in
2005 is -0.4 percent. As will be explained later, the current estimate will
likely be revised in the future as new data sources become available and
the Commerce Department refines its statistical procedures. 
Although the saving rate declined in many other developed countries
over this period, the downward trend in the U.S. saving rate was particu-
larly pronounced. The personal saving rates for Canada, Germany, Japan,
and the United States all declined from 1988 to 2005 (Chart 2).
4 The
household saving rate for Germany declined modestly from 13.2 percent
of disposable income in 1988 to 10.6 percent in 2005, a decline of 2.6
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percentage points. The Japanese saving rate declined by a much larger 6.8
percentage points over that period, almost as large as the decline in the
U.S. rate. However, the Japanese saving rate was much higher at the
beginning of the period and thus remained about seven percentage points
above the U.S. rate in 2005. The Canadian saving rate was well above the
U.S. rate in 1988 but fell more sharply over this period and, like the U.S.
rate, was slightly negative in 2005. 
Possible economic explanations
What economic factors might account for the pronounced decline
in the U.S. personal saving rate? A wide variety of explanations have
been proposed, including lack of self-control on the part of U.S. con-
sumers and increased access to credit by households that previously
were unable to borrow. Much of the economic debate, however, has
considered the importance of wealth effects on consumer spending
from the large increases in stock and home prices since the mid-1980s.
Modern economic thought suggests that saving and consumption
depend on expectations about the future—for example, expected future
labor income or expected returns on stocks and bonds. Economists
often assume that current consumption and saving depend on “perma-
nent income” or “life-cycle income,” concepts that include expected
future resources as well as resources that are currently in hand. Econo-
mists sometimes even define income as the maximum amount that
households can consume on a sustainable basis given their current and
expected future resources.
5 Clearly this definition of income is not well
suited for national income accounting because the accountant does not
have available reliable measures of future labor income or asset returns.
Economists have traditionally believed that the permanent-income
and life-cycle views of consumption imply a dependable relationship
between wealth and consumption. Economists estimated life-cycle con-
sumption functions implying that a $1 increase in household net worth
would raise consumption by roughly 3 cents. As a result, recent sharp
increases in stock market values and home equity may have raised con-
sumption relative to current disposable income, lowering the measured
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saving rate. For example, Juster and others argued that the decline in
the personal saving rate since the mid-1980s is mostly due to the large
capital gains on corporate stocks in this period.
6
But estimates of the wealth effect on consumption have been diffi-
cult to pin down empirically. For example, Ludvigson and Steindel
found that conventional estimates of the life-cycle wealth effect vary
substantially depending on which historical period is chosen for esti-
mating the relationship. Poterba noted that recent estimates of the
effect of stock market wealth range from around 1 cent on the dollar at
the low end to 5 cents on the dollar at the high end. 
Recent research also differs on the size of the wealth effect associ-
ated with a change in home values. Some recent research finds that an
increase in housing wealth has a larger effect on consumer spending
than changes in other kinds of wealth. Gains in stock market wealth
might have less effect in the short run on personal consumption because
households are aware that stock prices are highly volatile and, thus, do
not feel certain that recent gains in stock market wealth will persist.
Consistent with this view, Case, Quigley, and Shiller found a “rather
large effect of housing wealth upon household consumption.”  In con-
trast, Poterba’s survey of the empirical literature before 2000 found “at
best a weak link between house price changes and nonhousing con-
sumption.” The sharp fluctuations in corporate stock prices and the
large gain in home prices in recent years may eventually provide evi-
dence that will help researchers settle such empirical disputes. But
reliable empirical results will also require an understanding of the prob-
lems involved in measuring household saving accurately. 
II. ISSUES IN MEASURING PERSONAL SAVING
One major reason that the decline in the personal saving rate may
not be as alarming as it first appears is that the decline may partly reflect
measurement problems rather than a true decline in saving. This section
first shows that several alternative measures based on the NIPA defini-
tions may imply a somewhat higher or lower personal saving rate, but
such measures do not eliminate the downward trend. Evidence is then
presented that the personal saving rate has historically been revised
upward by fairly large amounts, although there is no guarantee that
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future revisions will be upward to the same extent. The section closes by
noting that possible conceptual changes in the national accounts related
to growth of the knowledge economy might raise estimated U.S. saving
and capital formation.
Alternative NIPA-concept measures
Alternative measures of the NIPA saving rate generally do not
eliminate the downward trend even though such measures may slightly
raise or lower the level of the personal saving rate. For example, one
alternative measure of the personal saving rate treats purchases of con-
sumer durable goods as a form of saving rather than consumption. The
NIPA defines durable goods as those with an average life of at least
three years. Because durable goods yield services to the purchaser over
several years, such goods can be viewed as an asset, with the associated
stream of services being the better measure of consumption. Purchas-
ing a durable good can thus be considered a form of saving. Chart 3
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presents alternative measures of the NIPA-concept personal saving rate
from the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds (FOF) accounts.
7 Although
taken from a different source than the national income accounts, the
basic saving measure in this chart is conceptually identical to the NIPA
measure. Essentially it is an alternative calculation of the same concept,
which can differ from the NIPA measure at any point in time but
shows a similar downward trend. The second series in the chart also
adopts the NIPA concepts except that purchases of consumer durable
goods are classified as saving.
Counting purchases of consumer durables as a form of saving raises
the personal saving rate but does not eliminate the downward trend in
the 1980s and 1990s. The NIPA-concept saving rate calculated from
the FOF statistics was actually negative in 2000, a year when the com-
parable saving rate from the national income accounts was positive. But
counting consumer durables as saving raises the personal saving rate in
2000 to about 1 percent. On average, counting consumer durables as
saving added about 2 percent to the saving rate from 1990 to 2004,
with the increase closer to 21/ 2 percent since 2000 because of the general
strength in consumer durables purchases. Nevertheless, recent saving
rates with consumer durables included in saving are still down substan-
tially from a rate near 13 percent in the 1970s and 1980s.
Another adjustment that tends to increase the measured personal
saving rate without eliminating the downward trend is to add federal
taxes on capital gains back into disposable personal income (Reinsdorf).
Critics of the standard NIPA measure of the personal saving rate some-
times note that it excludes capital gains and losses from personal income
but nevertheless subtracts tax payments on realized capital gains when
computing disposable income. An alternative measure leaves federal
taxes on realized capital gains in disposable income. This measure results
in a personal saving rate that is 1.65 percent higher in 2000, a period
when capital gains realizations were unusually high. But the measure
continued to display a sharp downward trend in the 1980s and 1990s.
In contrast, other measures of the NIPA-concept personal saving rate
slightly lower the household saving rate. However, these alternative meas-
ures also do not eliminate the downward trend. One possible adjustment
is to remove nonprofit institutions from the saving calculation. Because
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nonprofit institutions add more to personal income than to personal
outlays, this adjustment slightly lowers the household saving rate, but this
alternative measure has a similar downward trend.
Another adjustment that slightly lowers the personal saving rate is
to exclude defined benefit pensions from the household sector of the
national income accounts. The NIPA treats pension plans as part of the
household sector, an approach that is clearly appropriate for 401(k)
accounts and other defined-contribution plans because employees own
the assets and bear the risks of asset-market fluctuations. The treatment
of defined-benefit plans is less clear, however, because employers make
the investment decisions and bear the risks for such plans. Under stan-
dard NIPA accounting, an employer’s contribution to a pension fund
and the investment income from the fund are counted as personal
income. Because of the strong gain in equity values during the 1990s,
many employers were able to reduce their pension plan contributions
without reducing benefit payments to current retirees. Reduced pension
contributions thus lowered the measured personal saving rate, but alter-
native calculations suggest that this factor did not drive the overall
decline in the personal saving rate (Reinsdorf). An alternative measure
of the personal saving rate that excludes private and government
defined-benefit plans yields a lower personal saving rate that still shows
a pronounced downward trend.
Possible future revisions
The decline in the personal saving rate may not be as alarming as it
first appears partly because of the possibility of future upward revisions.
In practice, forecasters and policymakers must use the latest vintage of
economic statistics available at any point in time. But government stat-
isticians continue to revise their estimates of personal income and
outlays for many years after the initial release as new information
sources become available and improved methodologies emerge. Per-
sonal saving is the difference between personal income and personal
outlays, both of which are very large numbers. Relatively small percent-
age revisions to either of these numbers can produce large percentage
revisions to the estimated personal saving rate. 
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Past declines in the personal saving rate have tended to be revised
away as new vintages of data are released. Nakamura and Stark docu-
mented that the personal saving rate is revised for decades after the
initial release, and the revision can be substantial. Chart 4 plots the
advance (initially published) estimates of the personal saving rate and
the most recent estimates of the saving rate for the same period. Initially
published estimates of the personal saving rate from the third quarter of
1965 to the second quarter of 1999 were revised upward by an average
of 2.8 percentage points. But for the fourth quarter of 1981, the
upward revision was 7.3 percentage points, and the average revision for
1980-84 was 5.1 percentage points.
Nakamura and Stark documented that the largest revisions of the
personal saving rate typically occurred after benchmark revisions of the
NIPA following economic censuses. Large revisions to the personal
saving rate can occur decades after the initial estimate is published.
Another important source of revisions to the NIPA saving rate has been
Chart 4
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conceptual or methodological changes made during the benchmark revi-
sions that incorporated previously unmeasured sources of household
income. Nakamura and Stark noted, for example, that random IRS
audits to assess growth of the underground economy led to substantial
upward revisions to estimated income in the 1985 benchmark NIPA
revisions, with an associated upward revision to the personal saving rate. 
Although future revisions to the saving rate do not necessarily have
to be upward, some evidence is accumulating that the next benchmark
NIPA revision may raise the personal saving rate. The U.S. Census
Bureau benchmarked retail and food services sales to the 2002 Economic
Census, revising some spending categories back as far as 1992. Retail and
food services sales for 2005, for example, were revised downward by 1.6
percent. Such revisions suggest that personal consumption expenditures
may have been overstated in the NIPA accounts. Feroli estimated that
this overstatement of personal consumption expenditures lowered the
NIPA personal saving rate by 1.5 percentage points. Assuming no other
sources of revision to NIPA consumption or income, this downward
revision to consumer spending would be enough to return the personal
saving rate to a positive but still low value.
Saving and the knowledge economy
Growth of the knowledge economy is an important factor in assess-
ing the possibility of future upward revisions to NIPA saving.
Greenspan noted in 1996 that it would have been virtually impossible
in the mid-20th century to imagine the extent to which “concepts and
ideas would substitute for physical resources and human brawn in the
production of goods and services.”  In the ten years since that comment
was made, the trend toward a knowledge economy has only accelerated.
This change in the economy may eventually require major statistical
and conceptual changes in the national accounts.
A growing share of real output is devoted to producing new ideas
rather than investing in physical capital. Nakamura has argued that a large
share of national wealth resides in intangible assets, such as patents, brand
names, copyrights, and data bases. Traditional accounting practices treat
expenditures to develop such assets as a business expense rather than the
purchase of a productive asset. If such expenditures were treated as capital
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investment, similar to the purchase of a new factory or equipment, cor-
porate profits and assets would be higher. One step in this direction was
the Commerce Department’s decision to treat business purchases of soft-
ware as a kind of investment rather than as a business expense.
At the household level, a similar measurement issue is the treatment
of private education expenditures. In an economy in which knowledge is
the key productive asset, educational expenditures could be considered a
form of saving. Households build up knowledge capital that is expected
to result in higher incomes in the future, either for current wage earners
or their children. But current NIPA procedures count such expenditures
as consumption. Household expenditures on education and research
amounted to over $224 billion in 2005. If such expenditures were
excluded from personal consumption, the saving rate would rise from its
low negative value to about 2 percent of disposable income.
III. HOW WORRIED SHOULD WE BE?
Although there are reasons to think that the personal saving rate
might be revised upward in the years ahead, exceptionally large revisions
would be needed to eliminate the current downward trend. But there are
other economic factors that should be weighed in assessing the low per-
sonal saving rate. Some of these factors suggest concern is warranted,
while others imply the decline may not be a serious problem. This
section weighs these various economic factors along with the measure-
ment issues to provide some perspective on the low personal saving rate.
Rising household net worth
An important factor in assessing the low personal saving rate is the
rising net worth of U.S. households. In sharp contrast to the declining
NIPA personal saving rate, household net worth has increased substan-
tially over the last decade. Standard measures of household net worth
come from the FOF accounts constructed by the staff at the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Accompanying these accounts
are estimated balance sheets for the U.S. economy that report assets,
both tangible and financial, and liabilities at the end of each quarter
(Table 1). For the fourth quarter of 2005, households and nonprofit
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institutions had estimated assets of $64 trillion, of which about 60
percent were held as financial assets and the rest as tangible assets. Real
estate was the bulk of tangible assets, with most of the rest being con-
sumer durable goods. Liabilities were $11.9 trillion, consisting mostly
of home mortgages and consumer credit.
The growth of household net worth over time represents a potential
increase in resources available for future needs, such as retirement of the
baby-boom generation.
8 Chart 5 shows the change in household net
worth as a percentage of disposable income. The growth in household
wealth relative to income has been quite high, on average—household
net worth rose by about 34 percent of disposable income yearly from
1980 to 2004. However, growth was extremely volatile from year to year,
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technology stock bubble—to a 22 percent decline in 2002 during the
subsequent stock market correction. Changes in stock prices account for
most of the year-to-year volatility in household wealth accumulation. 
Although the volatile annual changes in household net worth are dif-
ficult to assess, a smoother measure suggests only a moderate decline in
the rate of wealth accumulation in recent years. Chart 5 also shows the
change in trend household net worth as a percent of disposable income.
9
Trend household net worth rose by about 25 percent of disposable
income per year in the 1950s. The growth rate for trend wealth rose sub-
stantially in the 1960s and early 1970s but has decreased moderately since
the mid-1970s. Recently, the change in trend net worth has been 23 to
25 percent of disposable income, similar to the rate in the 1950s.
The permanence of recent gains in household net worth is difficult
to assess because of the growing importance of intangible assets in the
knowledge economy. To the extent that corporations have accumulated
a stock of intangible assets that are currently unmeasured in the
Chart 5
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national accounts, a higher stock price may be justified. Relatively high
stock values in the late 1990s and early 2000s may reflect investors’
growing realization of the importance of such intangible assets.
Research by Hall suggested that some part of the sharp increase in
household net worth over the last decade may be sustainable. It repre-
sents corporate accumulation of intangible assets related to growth of
the knowledge economy. Hall emphasized what he called “e-capital,” a
body of business methods and organizational knowledge that has
allowed some industries to dramatically raise productivity and customer
service. Hall argued that this rapid accumulation of e-capital was essen-
tially an “upsurge in saving resulting at least in part from technical
progress in forming e-capital.” Such saving does not appear in corporate
accounts or the NIPA, but the evidence for this saving is “manifested in
the rising stock market.”
Greater inclusion of intangible assets in the national income
accounts also would increase measured corporate and net national
saving. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel have estimated the amount of
intangible investment excluded from GDP, finding that the amount
could be as much as $800 billion annually.
10 Omission of intangible
assets may also lead to an understatement of the business capital stock by
up to $3 trillion. Because intangible investments accelerated in the
1990s, including such investments in the national accounts would likely
offset some of the apparent decline in the national saving rate as well as
make current corporate share valuations appear more sustainable. 
Weighing the long-run concerns
Weighing the long-run concerns may be more difficult than assessing
the short-term risks to economic performance.
11 Although cyclical changes
in the personal saving rate have occurred in the past, the projected aging of
the U.S. population over the next 25 years is unprecedented in our nation’s
history and therefore might pose unanticipated challenges. Most econo-
mists and policymakers feel that more personal saving would be desirable
to meet such challenges, but putting any dollar amount on the needed
increase in saving seems highly speculative at this point. Instead, two
factors are noted that suggest that any long-term saving deficit may not be
as alarming as some discussions would imply.
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First, the measurement problems discussed earlier are relevant in
assessing the long-term adequacy of household savings. Even if the per-
sonal saving rate were revised upward, it would still be low unless the
revisions are much larger than average. But if the growth of the knowl-
edge economy were fully incorporated in saving measures, the personal
saving rate would likely rise, and current high asset values would appear
more sustainable. Such assets could provide financial resources to meet
future retirement needs for the U.S. population, and the associated
growth in productivity of U.S. firms and workers could contribute
needed additional output of real goods and services.
Second, new simulation models provide growing evidence that most
U.S. households are behaving in line with the predictions of economic
theory. If households follow the permanent income hypothesis or the
life-cycle model, they rationally assess future retirement needs and adjust
saving and consumption appropriately as current asset values change.
Scholz and others found that over 80 percent of U.S. households have
accumulated more wealth than their optimal targets, taking into account
their demographic characteristics and realistic expectations about future
earnings and retirement benefits. But even though most households
appear to be on track to reach their required retirement nest eggs, some
households are not. Undersavers are concentrated in the bottom half of
the lifetime income distribution and tend to be disproportionately
single-person households.
12 In addition, large unanticipated shocks to
the economy and financial markets might endanger the retirement plans
of households whose savings appear to be on track. Thus, the long-run
concerns about personal saving should not be dismissed entirely, but the
problem may not be as severe as the downward trend in the personal
saving rate suggests.
Weighing the short-run concerns
With respect to short-term economic performance, many commen-
tators have expressed concern that the low personal saving rate increases
the risk of a sharp slowdown in the future. Generally, the concern is
that saving is unsustainably low and that a retrenchment in consumer
spending will reduce aggregate demand and real economic growth. In
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dollars, and disposable personal income was $8,120 billion. If the per-
sonal saving rate were suddenly to increase by one percentage point of
disposable income, with the increase occurring solely through a decline
in personal consumption, then consumption would have to fall by
about $80 billion, or 0.7 percent of real GDP in 2005. If this decline
occurred in one quarter, it would reduce real GDP growth by 2.8
percent at an annual rate, which would be a substantial drag on overall
growth. Moreover, such a one-percentage-point increase in the saving
rate would still leave the personal saving rate well below its average of
around 7.5 percent since 1950, suggesting any upward correction in the
saving rate might exceed one percentage point.
But the relationship between the NIPA personal saving rate and
economic slowdowns is more complicated than this back-of-the-enve-
lope calculation suggests. For example, historical evidence shows the
personal saving rate has sometimes changed very little before or during
recessions. Chart 6 plots the NIPA personal saving rate from 1950 to
the present with recessions shaded.
13 During some recessions, such as
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those in the 1970s and early 1980s, the personal saving rate increased
sharply before or during the recession. But such a pattern was not at all
clear during the 1950s and early 1960s or in the last two recessions. For
example, during the relatively mild 1990-91 recession, the saving rate
was fairly flat immediately before and during the recession, and the
broader trend during this period was a decline.
An increase in the personal saving rate need not occur as described
in the preceding illustrative calculation in which personal consumption
expenditures fall. For example, the personal saving rate could adjust
upward gradually if consumption grows at its longer-term average rate,
while the growth rate of disposable income increases. This alternative
scenario could be consistent with a permanent-income or life-cycle
theory of consumer behavior. Forward-looking households would have
initially incorporated all available information about future income into
their consumption plans. If new information were to become available
that disposable income is likely to increase faster in the future, house-
holds might immediately boost their estimates of permanent income,
and would increase their consumption accordingly. Because the increase
in consumption precedes the anticipated increase in income, the meas-
ured saving rate initially might decline. But if the income increases
materialize as expected, consumption need not be adjusted further, and
the more rapid gains in disposable income would raise the measured
saving rate.
Some empirical research supports the view that a low personal
saving rate predicts faster economic growth rather than the more widely
discussed scenario of a slowdown. Ireland estimated a quarterly model
of labor income and savings and imposed restrictions derived from the
permanent income model. The resulting model had smaller forecasting
errors than economic models without such restrictions. Most impor-
tant, Ireland concluded that “Estimates from this model show that the
U.S. data conform not to conventional wisdom, but to the intuition
provided by the permanent income hypothesis;  historically, declines in
savings have preceded periods of faster, not slower, income growth.”
In contrast, Nakamura and Stark found that saving rates are not
useful for forecasting economic growth in a real-time setting. They
conducted forecasting experiments similar to those of Ireland, but
using real disposable income instead of labor income for reasons of
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data availability. Although Ireland’s results appear to be correct for
heavily revised data, which should more closely reflect the “true” per-
sonal saving rate, the real-time data available historically to forecasters
have not improved predictions of real disposable income, real GDP, or
personal consumption.
Although such evidence does not guarantee that a sudden increase in
the personal saving rate will not hurt short-run economic performance,
both empirical evidence and theoretical reasoning suggest a low personal
saving rate does not necessarily imply painful economic adjustments. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Economists and policymakers have expressed concern about the
decline in the personal saving rate over the last two decades. This article
does not mean to suggest that saving should not be a matter of policy
concern. Some part of the U.S. population likely is not saving ade-
quately for future retirement needs, and large adjustments in the
personal saving rate could pose short-term cyclical problems if the
adjustments occurred sharply. However, this article has provided some
perspective on the issue by examining various measurement problems
and economic arguments. There are reasons to think that the NIPA esti-
mate of the personal saving rate might be revised upward in the future.
In addition, a revised accounting framework that better reflected growth
of the knowledge economy would likely raise estimated personal saving
as well as making current stock market valuations appear more sustain-
able. To the extent that American households have correctly anticipated
future gains in productivity and labor income and incorporated these
expectations into their spending plans, any future adjustments in con-
sumption spending need not be wrenching. Although there are some
legitimate reasons for concern, the decline in the personal saving rate
may not be as alarming as it appears. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2006 25
ENDNOTES
1This article focuses on the decline in the personal saving rate. A complete
understanding of the forces affecting the U.S. capital stock and productivity,
however, requires a look at national saving. National saving is the sum of personal
saving, corporate saving, and government saving. The national saving rate,
defined as national saving as a percentage of gross national income, has also
trended downward in recent decades. Corporate saving has not had the pro-
nounced downward trend seen in personal saving, and in fact, corporate saving
was relatively strong at 3.7 percent of gross national income in 2005. But the gov-
ernment has consistently run a deficit—its saving has been negative—and that
has substantially lowered the national saving rate in recent decades. Combining
these rates, the national saving rate was 0.9 percent in 2005, down from 8.3 per-
cent in 1970.
2Gross saving includes funds that go to replace depreciating capital goods. If
such depreciation is subtracted out, net saving represents resources that are avail-
able to increase the capital stock over and above its level at the start of the period.
Although discussions of economic growth typically focus on net saving, gross sav-
ing may also be important because the replacement of existing equipment and
software often introduces newer and more productive technologies. 
3Personal income includes wage and salary income and benefits, interest and
dividend income, proprietors’ and rental income, and net transfer payments. Dis-
posable personal income is personal income minus personal taxes. In the NIPA
accounts, disposable personal income includes the income of nonprofit institu-
tions and unincorporated businesses in addition to households. Personal con-
sumption expenditures were more than 96 percent of personal outlays in 2005.
4Chart 2 presents net household saving rates published by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development.
5Ireland provides an excellent discussion of Friedman’s permanent income
hypothesis. Similar ideas are developed in the life-cycle hypothesis of Modigliani
and Brumberg. 
6Their overall estimate of the wealth effect was consistent with the 3 cents on
the dollar figure. However, disaggregating by asset class, the study found a much
larger estimate of the stock market wealth effect—as much as 19 cents on the dol-
lar. A complete review of estimates of the wealth effect is beyond the scope of this
article. Poterba provided an excellent overview of studies up to 2000.
7Teplin provides an overview of the U.S. FOF accounts and some of their
uses. The FOF accounts record net transactions in over 40 types of financial
instruments by 30 economic sectors, including incorporated and unincorporated
businesses, the federal government, state and local governments, and various
financial intermediaries. The household information discussed here is, thus, a
small part of the information in the FOF accounts.
8An important limitation of the aggregate measures of household net worth
is that such measures do not reflect differing developments across household
income or wealth categories. Because wealth is distributed unevenly, capital gains
by wealthy households might disguise a deteriorating financial situation for
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households with lower wealth. The Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer
Finances showed, for example, a complex pattern of distributional changes
between 2001 and 2004 (Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore). 
9The trend in household net worth was computed using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with annual data and the default tuning parameter of 100 in the
RATS statistical package. The change in the trend is then expressed as a percent
of disposable personal income.
10In an earlier study, Nakamura estimated that excluding intangible invest-
ments could lower GDP by over $1 trillion annually. National income statisticians
began to include some expenditures on intangible assets as business investment in
1999 when computer software was added to NIPA business investment. 
11This section focuses on the long-term challenge from population aging.
The low personal saving rate is also related, however, to the large U.S. current
account deficit. An increase in the personal saving rate would raise national sav-
ing—other factors held constant—and reduce the need for the United States to
borrow abroad to finance domestic investment.
12Scholz and others noted, however, that these results applied specifically to a
sample of households age 51 to 61 in 1992. Caution should be used in generaliz-
ing the findings to younger households, especially if the social security program is
changed substantially in the future.
13The shaded regions in Chart 6 are recessions as dated by the National
Bureau of Economic Research. The NBER determines monthly dates for peaks
and troughs in economic activity. Chart 6 presents quarterly observations with
the peaks and troughs corresponding to the quarters in which the monthly
NBER turning-point dates fall.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2006 27
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